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[T]he Linux philosophy is "laugh in the face of danger."
Oops. Wrong one. "Do it yourself." That's it.

1

*

I would like to thank Professors Rebecca Eisenberg, Don Herzog, and Molly Van Hou�
weling for their extremely helpful comments on previous drafts. I would also like to thank Carey
Cuprisin, Alicia Frostick, and Kamal Ghali for fruitful conversations and criticisms. In the interest
of full disclosure, I should mention that I run Linux. This Note is licensed under the Creative Com
mons Attribution-Noncommercial License. To view a copy of this license, visit
http: //creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/.
I. Posting of Linus Torvalds to linux.dev.kernel, http://groups.google.com/group/
linux.dev.ke mel/msgn4ee0b ld6420cd08 (Oct. 16, 1 996, 2:00 a.m.) (punctuation altered to conform
to American usage).
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I NTRODUCTION
In 1 991 , Linus Torvalds released the first version of the Linux operating
2
system. Like many other beneficiaries of the subsequent dot-com boom, Tor
valds worked on a limited budget. Clad in a bathrobe, clattering away on a
computer purchased on credit, subsisting on a diet of pretzels and dry pasta,3
hiding in a tiny room that was outfitted with thick black shades designed to
4
block out Finland's summer sun, Torvalds programmed Linux.
Like some other beneficiaries of the subsequent dot-com boom, Torvalds

created a product that is now used by millions. He owns stock options worth
seven figures. 5 Computer industry giants, such as IBM, Novell, and Sun, have
invested time and energy in his work.6 But unlike many other beneficiaries of

the subsequent dot-com boom, Torvalds gave Linux away for free.'
8
For free? Well, not exactly. Linux was released under a software license
known as the GNU General Public License ("GPL").9 The GPL allows users

2. LINUS TORVALDS & DAVID DIAMOND, JUST FOR FUN: THE STORY OF AN ACCIDENTAL
REVOLUTIONARY 87 (200 1 ) (noting that version 0.01 of the Linux operating system was uploaded
on September 17, 1 99 1 ). But see Linux World News Desk, LinuxWorld Exclusive: Linus Discloses
*Real* Fathers of Linux, LINUX WORLD (May 17, 2004), http://www.linuxworld.com/
story/4485 1 .htm (citing Torvalds's response to an accusation that he didn't create Linux: 'Ok, I
admit it. I was just a front-man for the real fathers of Linux, the Tooth Fairy and Santa Claus'").
"

3. Torvalds describes his work schedule on Linux as "program-sleep-program-sleep
program-eat (pretzels)-program-sleep-program-shower (briefly). " ToRVALDS, supra note 2, at 78. To
be fair, Torvalds also admits to purchasing pizza and beer. Id. at 93.
4.

Id. at 60, 64.

5. See Gary Rivlin, Leader of the Free World, WIRED, Nov. 2003, http://www.wired.com/
wired/archive/1 1 . 1 1/Jinus_pr.html. Torvalds's wealth is mostly the result of donations. Red Hat and
VA Linux, companies that make money by selling services associated with Linux products, granted
Torvalds stock options when they went public. Id. This wasn't the first time Torvalds had money
donated to him; shortly after he released the first version of Linux, a fan took up a collection to help
Torvalds pay off his computer. ToRVALDS, supra note 2, at 64. Neither Red Hat nor VA Linux had
any legal obligation to Torvalds.
6. Linux at IBM, hnp: //www.ibm.com/linux (last visited June 1 2, 2005); Novell and Linux,
hnp://www.novell.com/linux/ (last visited June 12, 2005); Sun and Linux, http://www.sun.com/
software/Jinux/index.xml (last visited June 1 2, 2005).
7. Torvalds's first public announcement of the nascent Linux operating system describes the
project as "free. " Posting of Linus Benedict Torvalds to comp.os.minix, http://groups.google.com/
groups?selm=l991 Aug25.205708.9541 %40klaava.Helsinki.FI (Aug. 25, 1 99 1 23: 1 2 :08 PST). The
word free is ambiguous in this context. FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, THE FREE SOFTWARE DEF1NITION (2004), http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html (explaining that free can mean at least
"free as in beer, " referring to the price, and "free as in speech, " referring to the ability to modify and
distribute the code). In this Note, I use "free software " or sometimes "open source software " to refer
to software released under the GPL. This is not quite proper; while software released under the GPL
is both free and open source, not all open-source or free software is released under the GPL. See
FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, CATEGORIES OF FREE AND NON-FREE SOFTWARE (2001),
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/categories; OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, THE OPEN SOURCE DEF1NI
TION (2005), http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition_plain.php.
8. The original Linux copyright license allowed users to use and modify the program, as
Jong as the code was not sold and any improvements were released in both object and source code.
TORVALDS, supra note 2, at 94. See infra, notes 1 1-14 and accompanying text for an explanation of
object and source code. Torvalds released the source code under the GPL, cited infra, note 9, shortly
thereafter. TORVALDS, supra note 2, at 96.
9. FREE SOFTWARE FouNDATION, GNU GENERAL Pusuc LICENSE (1 991), http: //www.gnu.org/
copyleft/gpl.html [hereinafter GPL] . GNU is a recursive acrony m, which stands for GNU's Not Unix.
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to give copies of the software to friends or family-in fact, to the world at
large. 10 And while most commercial software is released in the form of ob
ject code-instructions to a computer, consisting of unintelligible strings of

ones and zeros 11-software released under the GPL must give the user ac
2
cess to what is known as source code:1 the human readable translation of
3
those instructions. 1 For the user who just wants to run the software, only
4
object code is required.1 But source code availability may indirectly help
even typical users. The GPL allows anyone to use the more easily decipher

able source code to modify the software and redistribute those modifications
to the world at large.15 These modifications could range from minor bug

fixes to the reuse of source code in an entirely different project.

But the GPL has a catch: it strictly lays out the terms on which future

distributions can be made. To be covered by the license, a user who gives
out modified code must release the entire work under the GPL, and must
6
include notice of the terms of the license for all subsequent distributors. 1

The developer distributing the modified code is free to charge any price she
7
wants to transfer the program to the next user.1 But because the distribution
must be made under the GPL, the developer must give that user the right to
8
transfer the program to anyone, at no charge.1 Once the software has been

J O . "You may copy and distribute verbatim copies of the Program's source code as you re
ceive it, in any medium. . . ." GPL, supra note 9, §I.
1 1 . For an example of object code in hexadecimal rather than binary, see Stephen M.
McJohn, The Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 2 6-27 (2000).
1 2 . GPL, supra note 9 ("The act of running the Program is not restricted, and the output from
the Program is covered only if its contents constitute a work based on the Program (independent of
having been made by running the Program)."). It has been argued that the GPL is ambiguous about
the right to run the program. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, De-Bugging Open Source Software Licens
ing, 64 U. Prrr. L. REv. 75, 84-85. From a legal enforcement perspective, this is idle speculation;
people who release software under the GPL almost certainly think that they are giving a license to
copy and use the software. See id. at 85. Nobody else has standing to sue.
1 3 . JAMES P. COHOON & JACK W. DAVIDSON, C++ PROGRAM DESIGN 1 3-14 ( 1 997).
Throughout this work, "code" and "source code" are used interchangeably.
1 4 . See McJohn, supra note 1 1 , at 27. But even users who have no wish to modify the source
code may get benefits from its availability. See GENTOO FOUNDATION, INC., GENTOO LINUX FRE
QUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/faq.xml#differences (last visited Oct.
29, 2005) (explaining that compiling the source code with options specific to your computer en
hances security and speed). Some, including the author of this Note, believe that compiling your
own operating system entirely from source code significantly enhances geek cred. See Question
A.bout Gentoo's Speed, http://www.linuxquestions.org/questions/archive/5/2003/05/l/58 1 1 2 (last
visited June 12, 2005).
15.

GPL, supra note 9 , § 2 .

1 6. GPL, supra note 9, §§I, 2. If the user fails to comply with these terms, of course, she
would be in violation of copyright. See Eben Moglen, Freeing the Mind: Free Software and the
Death of Proprietary Culture, 56 ME. L. REV. 1, 7 (2004) (discussing his efforts in enforcing the
GPL); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain,
LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoB., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33, 65.
1 7 . GPL, supra note 9, at preamble, §I; FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, SELLING FREE
SOFTWARE (2005), http://www.fsf.org/licensing/essays/selling.html.
1 8. See supra note I0 and accompanying text; see also GPL, supra note 9, § 2(b) ("You must
cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the
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transferred from the original owner, the market cost will tend toward the
9
cost of distribution.1

The GPL has outgrown its humble origins. It started out as a vehicle by
2
which individuals could swap software they had personally written. 0 But

these days, computer giants IBM, Sun, and Novell, among others, have in
2
corporated software released under the GPL into their business plans. 1 Red
22
Hat, IBM, and Novell all offer similar Linux services, but use code sup
2
plied to each other under the GPL. 3 The GPL now facilitates cooperative
research among competing software developers.

2
When competitors collaborate, antitrust law raises its head. 4 Collabora
25
tions are, of course, allowed. Sometimes, these alliances result in new
2
products that could not have been made available without cooperation. 6 But
competitors can also collude to boost illicit profit through behaviors that
restrain fair market competition. Agreements that facilitate divvying up the
27

ill-gotten swag of a cartel give rise to treble damages and jail time.

Program or any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the
terms of this License.").
19. See Klaus M. Schmidt & Monika Schnitzer, Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some
Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market, 1 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 473, 477-78 (2003). And the
marginal cost of distribution is, in this era, vanishingly small-the price of bandwidth or the price to
copy a CD. Id.
20. The founder of the GNU project, Richard Stallman, explained at the time: "[I)f I like a
program, I must share it with other people who like it. Software sellers want to divide the users and
conquer them, making each user agree not to share with others. I refuse to break solidarity with
other users in this way." RICHARD STALLMAN, THE GNU MANIFESTO (2005), http://www.gnu.org/
gnu/manifesto.html.
21.

See supra note 6.

22. Among other things, all three offer services to help companies migrate to Linux. Migra
tion Center, http://www.redhat.com/migrate (last visited Sept. 1 2, 2005); Migrating to Linux the
Novell Way, http://www.novell.com/linux/migrate (last visited Sept. 1 2, 2005) ; The Linux at IBM
Competitive Advantage, http://www.ibm.com/linux/competitive/windowsToLinux.stml (last visited
Oct. 23, 2005).
23. In particular, all three use and contribute to the Linux kernel, the heart of the operating
system. RED HAT LINUX, RED HAT EXPANDS LINUX KERNEL DEVELOPMENT GROUP (Feb. 1 , 2000),
http://www.redhat.com/en_us/USA/home/company/news/prarchive/2000/press_Iinuxkemel.html;
Robert McMillan, $1 Billion Well Spent? An Interview with Big Blue's New Boss, LINUX PLANET,
Apr. 24, 2003, http://www.linuxplanet.com/linuxplanet/interviews/4768/ l ; John Koenig, Q-A with
Matt Asay of Novell and OSBC, IT MANAGER'S J., Mar. 14, 2005, http://management.
i tmanagersjournal.corn/article. pl ?sid=05/03/09/0 1 29225 .
24. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLEC
TUAL PROPERTY 1 2 ( 1 995), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf (explaining how
the Department of Justice would evaluate intellectual property shared among major firms). See also
Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1 1 33, 1 140 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Antitrust laws ac
knowledge these benefits [of cooperation], but still treat the arrangements with skepticism, for
seemingly benign agreements may conceal highly anticompetitive schemes.").
25. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 ( 1 979) ("Joint
ventures and other cooperative arrangements are also not usually unlawful . . . .").
26.

See id. at 17.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (making contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of
27.
trade potentially felonies); 15 U.S.C. § 1 5(a) (2000) (allowing recovery of treble damages in civil
suits for violation of antitrust laws). For an example of one swag-division scheme that fell afoul of
Section One, see B erkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 301 (2d Cir. 1979)
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28
Under Section One of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has excori
2
ated competitors who conspire to fix prices. 9 In United States v. Line
30
Material Co , several companies held patents that were collectively needed
to manufacture a particular fuse. 3 1 The patent holders granted one another
.

the rights to sublicense the other's patents to third parties, but bound licens
32
ing parties to charge certain prices on the fuse. Thus, no company could
33
produce the fuse without charging a particular price. Notwithstanding lim
3
ited exemptions granted to some holders of patents, 4 the Supreme Court
held that "when patentees join in an agreement . . . to maintain prices on

their several products, that agreement . . . is unlawful per se under the
3
Sherman Act." 5
3
Under Line Material, 6com etitors cannot exchange licenses that re
3 .p
quire fixed prices to be charged. Now imagine that two competing software
manufacturers, CompuTrust and MonopoSoft, want to pool some of their

intellectual resources-in particular, software code. Because the code is
protected by copyright, the two competitors must grant each other rights to

the code. They choose to do so under a hypothetical license called the Gen
eral Fixing License ("GFL"). Now comes the wrongful division of swag: the

("There is a vast difference, however , between actions legal when taken by a single firm and those
permitted for two or more companies acting in concert . . . [A] monopolist may, assuming he ac
quired his power legally, charge any nonpredatory price for his product, but agreements among
competitors to raise prices have been recognized as per se violations of the Sherman Act since So

cony-Vacuum.").
28.
29.

Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 (2000).
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 397-98 (1927) (holding that uni

form price-fixing is per se unreasonable); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150,

218 (1940) (reaffirming Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S. 392).
30.

333 U. S. 287 (1948).

31.

Id. at 290-91.

32.

Id. at 293. Actually, there was some question as to whether the agreement bound all
parties to charge fixed prices, but the court found that at least one party would have to fix prices. Id.
at 295.
33.

Id. at 297.

34. One such exemption was established in United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U. S. 476,
488-90 (1926), which held that because the patent monopoly granted by the U. S. government gave
the patent holder the right to charge monopoly prices, a license agreement restricting the price that a
single licensee could charge was not a violation of antitrust law. The Line Material court upheld that
exemption, but narrowed it considerably. Line Material, 333 U. S. at 299-306.

35.

Line Material, 333 U. S. at 314.

36.

While Line Material involved patents, "the competitive concerns with copyrights, trade
marks or other forms of intellectual property are about the same as those applying to patents. "
HERBERT HovENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 252 (3d ed. 1999).

37. Line Material, 333 U. S. at 311; see also United States v. Masonite Corp. , 316 U. S. 265,
282 (1942) (applying per se rule to price-fixing among patent holders); United States v. New Wrinkle,
Inc., 342 U. S. 371, 378 (1952) (applying prohibitions of Sherman Act to particular use of patent
licenses). The application of the per se rule in the context of intellectual property licensing has come
under some modern fire; it may well not serve the strictures of Broadcast Music, discussed supra
Part I. But "the Court has not addressed the question in either the Chicago or the current, post
Chicago era. " LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WILLIAM s. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTE
GRATED HANDBOOK 870 (2000).
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GFL requires that anyone who uses the resulting code must "cause any work
that you distribute or publish, that in whole or in part contains or is derived
from the Program or any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole for two
8
thousand dollars. "3
By exchanging software under licenses that control the price charged for
subsequent licenses, the two competitors can fix uniform prices on their

competing products. Because CompuTrust's final software product contains

MonopoSoft code, CompuTrust must abide by the terms of the GFL. 39 In
order for end users to legitimately use CompuTrust's product, they must

have permission to run not only CompuTrust's code, but also MonopoSoft's.

Thus, CompuTrust can sell a license to its complete product only if it can

grant sublicenses to third parties from MonopoSoft. The GFL gives Com

puTrust permission to grant those sublicenses, but only if it charges its
4
customers two grand. 0 Following the same reasoning, MonopoSoft will also
be bound to charge two thousand bucks. Presto: the GFL fixes prices, and is
4
per se illegal. 1

The per se rule against price-fixing applies regardless of the price being
42
Although two thousand dollars may be clearly excessive, the GFL

fixed.

would be per se illegal even if it fixed a lower price. Two thousand dollars
would be as illegal as two hundred dollars; two hundred dollars would be as
4
illegal as two dollars; and two dollars would be as illegal as two cents. 3
44
When it comes down to it, even zero prices have run afoul of antitrust law.

38. The language of the GFL has been chosen here to mostly mirror the language of the
GPL. See GPL, supra note 9, § 2(b) (emphasis added).
39. Using someone else's code requires a competitor to abide by the creator's license be
cause without a license, the competitor would be in violation of copyright law. 1 7 U.S.C. § 106 ( 1 )
(2) (2000) (establishing that copyright holder has exclusive right to authorize others to reproduce
and prepare derivative works).
40. If the rest of the GFL were similar to the GPL, fees for transferring copies would be
allowed. Two thousand dollars would then be a minimum--but equally illegal-price. Cf supra
note 1 7.
41.

See supra note 37.

42. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 ( 1 927) ("[T]he Sherman Law
and the judicial decisions interpreting it are based upon the assumption that the public interest is
best protected from the evils of monopoly and price control by the maintenance of competition.").
Despite some more recent uncertainty regarding price restraints, discussed infra Part I, even very
recent cases acknowledge that a price-fixing cartel is per se illegal. See Elliot Indus. v. BP Am. Prod.
Co., 407 F.3d 1 09 1 , 1 123 n.29 ( 1 0th Cir. 2005) (detailing elements of claim that agreement is a per
se violation of antitrust Jaws).
43. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 ( 1 998) ("It is no excuse that the
prices fixed are themselves reasonable."); Trenton Potteries Co. , 273 U.S. at 397-98 (holding that
because fixing prices "involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable
prices" agreements fixing prices are per se unreasonable regardless of reasonability of price); United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 338 ( 1 897).
44. See Home Placement Service, Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 682 F.2d 274, 279 ( ! st Cir.
1 982) ("[A] combination was formed which, in effect, fixed a maximum price of zero . . . . This is
suffi cient concerted action to bring defendant's conduct within the ambit of section I."). At this
point, it is sufficient to note that the Home Placement court did not apply a per se rule. The agree
ment in this case can be distinguished from the GPL. See infra note 1 38.
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Section 2(b) of the GPL restrains prices on sublicenses in a way that is
4
equivalent to the zero-price GFL. 5 Specifically, it requires that any deriva
4
tive work be licensed to third parties "at no charge." 6 But while it is easy to
imagine CompuTrust and MonopoSoft greedily raking in profits from

above-market pricing under the GFL, it's harder to contemplate Linux de
velopers rubbing their hands in glee as they rack up sale after sale at the

prices of zero, nothing, and no charge. There is something different about
nothing.

Over the last few years, some generalized worries about competition and
47
48
the GPL have surfaced in law review articles, one lawsuit, and discus
49
sions in the Linux community. Another recently filed lawsuit alleges more

specifically that software manufacturers releasing software under the GPL
have engaged in horizontal price-fixing.50 Responses to these worries have
ranged from dismissive to comprehensive. 5 1 While some of the lengthier

45.

Compare GPL supra note 9, at § 2(b), with supra, text accompanying note 38.

46.

GPL, supra note 9, § 2(b).

47. See Charles M. Gastle & Susan B oughs, Microsoft Ill and the Metes and Bounds of
Software Design and Technological Tying Doctrine, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. '1!7. 'll'[39-43 (2001) (dis
cussing technological tying with regard to open source software). This Note does not grapple head
to-head with the charge levied by Gastle & Boughs largely because contrary to their implication, see
id. at '1!38-39, Apache is not released under the GPL. APACHE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, LICENSES
(2005), http://www.apache.org/licenses. The GPL has also been accused of copyright misuse, an
offense whose elements are related to antitrust violations. See Christian H. Nadan, Open Source
Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 349, 368 (2002). Cf Robin Feldman, The
Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Misuse ?, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1 1 7 , 1 18
(2004) (noting that the principles of the GPL as applied to biotechnology "implicate the doctrine of
patent misuse"); Greg Vetter, Infectious Open Source Software: Spreading Incentives or Promoting
Resistance?, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 53, 143 n.229 (2004) (noting that the possibility of copyright misuse
increases in likelihood when terms are read to attach broadly to subsequent licenses).
48. See SCO's Answer to IBM's Am. Countercl. at 1 6, SCO Group, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No.
03-CV-0294 (D. Utah Oct. 24, 2003), available at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf/AnswerAmendCC.
1 0-24-03.pdf (claiming that among other things, the GPL violates antitrust laws). This claim was
removed from later filings. See SCO's Answer to IBM's Second Am. Countercl . at 20, SCO Group,
Inc. v. IBM Corp., No 03-CV-0294 (D. Utah Apr. 23, 2004), available at http://www.groklaw.net/
pdf/IBM- 141-1 .pdf.
49. See, e.g., Posting of Deven T. Corzine to wine-license mailing list, http://www.winehq.
org/hypermail/wine-license/2002/07/00 1 6.html (Jul. 15, 2002, 1 1 :59: 10) (discussing whether GPL
would run afoul of antitrust laws)Posting of Claus Farber to list-fsf-eu-discussion@faerber.muc.de,
http://mail.fsfeurope.org/pipermail/discussion/2002-arch/002647.html (20 Mar 2002 1 5 :57 :00)
(discussing theoretical possibility that Free Software could violate antitrust laws); Posting of James
Heald to http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/fsfe-uk/2003- 1 2/msg00007.html (Dec. 3, 2003, 20:50:59)
(noting that the GPL may fix prices artificially in violation of potential EU antitrust law) .
50. Compl. with Req. for Inj. Relief at 3, Wallace v. Free Software Foundation, Inc., filed
4/28/2005, 1 : 05-cv-006 18-JDT-TAB (S.D. Ind. 2005), available at http://www.groklaw.net/
pdf/Wallace-Complaint.pdf (alleging that the Free Software Foundation has "conspired and agreed
with individual software authors and commercial distributors of commodity software products such
as Red Hat Inc. and Novell Inc. to artificially fix the prices charged for computer software pro
grams .. .") [hereinafter Wallace Complaint].
5 1 . For one example of dismissive rhetoric, see Stephen Shankland, SCO Attacks Open
Source Foundation, CNET News.com, Oct. 28 2003, http://news.com.com/2100-7344_35 09861 0.html?tag=nefd_top (describing Eben Moglen's response to SCO's claim that the GPL
violates antitrust laws as well as the U.S. Constitution). Moglen's dismissiveness-at least with
respect to SCO's claims that the GPL violates the Constitution-is not inappropriate. A somewhat
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responses touch on general worries about competition, and even mention

potential pricing restraints in the GPL, they gloss over worries about price
s3
s
fixing. 2 And while the Open Source Development Lab has warned Linux

developers not to discuss prices amongst themselves, it fails to note that the
s4
GPL itself explicitly mentions a price of zero. While the fate of Linux and
ss
the GPL is interesting to legal academia, the practice of sharing software
s
expressed in the GPL is beginning to spread to other fields. 6 Uncertainties

about antitrust issues, if not addressed, may hamper the wider adoption of
s7
public sharing in these other fields.
This Note argues that Section 2(b) of the GPL, which requires that sub

licenses be granted at no charge, is a permissible price restraint. The

justification for this is ... nothing. Or, rather: a price of nothing on future
distributions can and should be distinguished from non-zero prices. Al
though the vast majority of price-fixing is per se illegal, restraints on price

that are necessary to achieve important procompetitive goals may be evalu-

lengthier answer can be found at Jason B. Wacha, Taking the Case: ls the GPL Enforceable?, 21
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 451, 476-80 (2004).
52.
See Wacha, supra note 51, at 478-79 (asserting with little discussion of relevant case law
that the GPL does not constitute price-fixing because it has pro-competitive effects).
53.
The Open Source Development Lab is Linus Torvalds's current employer whose mission
is "to be the recognized center of gravity for Linux." OPEN SOURCE DEVELOPMENT LABS, ABOUT
OSOL (2005), http://www.osdl.org/about_osdl/. As part of this mission, the lab launched the Linux
Legal Defense Fund. OPEN SOURCE DEVELOPMENT LABS, LINUX LEGAL DEFENSE FUND (2005),
http://www.osdl.org/about_osdl/legal/lldf.
54.
OPEN SOURCE DEVELOPMENT LABS, ANTITRUST POLICY (2005), http://www.osdl.org/
docs/antitrust_policy.pdf.
55. If nothing else, discussions surrounding the GPL have sparked excellent work discussing
the future of intellectual property in a connected world. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE
OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); Yochai Benkler, Coase's
Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALEL.J. 369 (2002).
56.
J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for
Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB., Winter/Spring 2003, at 315, 430-31 (arguing that the Linux license can serve as a model for
a similar scientific community where "any exclusive rights granted by intellectual property laws
[would be used] to exclude exclusivity itself'); Press Release, IBM, IBM Statement of Non
Assertion
of
Named
Patents Against
OSS,
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/
pledgedpatents.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2005).
57.
See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation ? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 700 (1998) (noting that antitrust uncer
tainty could undermine attempts to pool intellectual property rights). There is some evidence that
antitrust worries have at least hampered the adoption of the GPL in computer software. In 1999,
several people noticed that reiserfs, a file system now used in the Linux kernel, had adopted a
version of the license that was incompatible with the GPL. Zack Brown, Kernel Traffic #44,
KERNEL TRAFFIC, Nov. 22, 1999, at subheading 4, http://www.kemeltraffic.org/kemel-traffic/
kt 19991122_44.html (noting that reiserfs mentioned the wrong license, and made exceptions to
the license incompatible with the GPL). The incompatible license plainly stated "it is the policy
of Namesys to license its software on reasonable terms which are in accord with the antitrust
laws. While one might argue that the GPL violates the antitrust laws, you should contact us and I
believe you will find that we are willing to license in accord with those laws." Id. Although
Namesys now licenses reiserfs under the GPL, see Reiserfs License (2004), available within
archive at http://ftp.namesys.com/pub/reiserfsprogs/reiserfsprogs-3.6. l 9.tar.gz, as reiserfsprogs3.6.19/COPYING, other software manufacturers, wary of antitrust's harsh consequences, may
hold back.
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8
ated under the less restrictive rule of reason,5 which weighs the anticom
petitive consequences of a practice against the procompetitive results.59 Part
I demonstrates that GPL-based software could not be freely shared and

modified without Section 2(b)'s restriction on price. The import of this is
that Section 2(b)'s restraint on price is ancillary to goals that serve competi

tion, and thus a per se rule should not be applied.

The prohibition on price-fixing arises out of two separate concerns about

competition. First, antitrust law seeks to protect consumers from higher
prices fixed by cartels rather than by a competitive market.60 Second, anti

trust law relies on market competition to produce higher-quality products. 61

The remainder of this Note demonstrates that the use of the GPL is consis
tent with the goals of antitrust law. Establishing that the restraint is ancillary

to other considerations does not determine whether the agreement violates

antitrust law; instead, the restraint's effect on competition must be evalu
ated.6 2
Part II claims that the worry regarding higher prices is alleviated by fix

ing a price of nothing on subsequent licenses. This price matters because a

price of nothing distinguishes valid pricing schemes, designed to reduce
high transaction costs associated with software licensing, from invalid
schemes designed to reap supracompetitive cartel profits.

Part III addresses the concern about competition in software quality. In
particular, Part III contends that the GPL's pricing restraint will result in
lower quality software only when consumers straightforwardly choose lower
prices over higher quality. Furthermore, the GPL reduces barriers to entry,

even for software manufacturers who may not adopt the GPL. The GPL
accomplishes this by charging nothing: access to source code allows others

to adopt or mimic GPL software without significant investments.

While prior analysis has concluded that the GPL escapes antitrust scru

tiny, it has failed to articulate how the GPL's pricing restraint should be
evaluated.6 3 This Note concludes that when it comes to the GPL, something
is great about nothing.

58.

Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. I, 23 ( 1 979).

59.

Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 30 ( 1 9 1 1 ) .

60. United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 397 ( 1 927) ("[T]he Sherman Law and
the judicial decisions interpreting it are based upon the assumption that the public interest is best
protected from the evils of monopoly and price control by the maintenance of competition.").
61.

See Id.

62.

See id.

63.

Wacha, supra note 5 1 , at 476-80.
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I. THE GPL's PRICING RESTRAINT S HOULD BE EVALUATED
U N DER THE RULE OF REASON

Software is like sex; it's better when it's free. 64
This Part argues that the GPL's pricing restraint should be evaluated un

der the rule of reason instead of a per se prohibition. While a per se
prohibition would immediately invalidate the GPL's pricing restraint, the

rule of reason would allow a balancing of the restraint's effects-both posi

tive and negative--0n competition. 65

While antitrust jurisprudence has repeatedly held that restraints fixing

prices are per se violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 66 this requirement

has not been read to absolutely bar all price-fixing activity. In Broadcast

Music, Inc.

v.

Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,61 the U.S. Supreme
8

Court warned against literal application of the price-fixing doctrine.6

Broadcast Music ("BMI") and the American Society of Composers, Au

thors, and Publishers ("ASCAP") collectively owned limited rights to
9
"[a]lmost every domestic copyrighted composition."6 Radio stations, wish
ing to play tunes on a regular basis, had little desire to negotiate
70
broadcasting rights with individual composers. In response, BMI and
ASCAP created a "blanket license" that allowed each station to play any

piece of music in the BMI/ASCAP repertoire in exchange for a percentage
7
of the station's revenue. 1
In the case below, the Court of Appeals ruled that the blanket license

joined together composers and publishers in a conspiracy that fixed a price
7
on broadcast rights. 2 The appeals court censured this literal price-fixing as
per se illegal.73

64. This quotation is generally attributed to Linus Torvalds. WIKIQUOTE, LINUS BENEDICT
ToRVALDS , http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Linus_Torvalds (last modified Oct. 11, 2005); Posting of
Jim Kingdon to dc.org.linux-users, http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=m2d95ews6d.fsf%40
harvey.cyclic.com (April, 11, 1996 3:00 a.m.). Torvald's brave sentiment must be balanced with the
bumper sticker on his wife's car: "coffee, chocolate, men: some things are better rich." Gary Rivlin,

Leader of the Free World: How Linus Torvalds Became Benevolent Dictator of P lanet Linux, the
Biggest Collaborative P roject in History, 11 WIRED MAGAZINE, Nov. 2003, at 152, 207, available
athttp://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11. l l /linus.html.
65.

See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 66-67 (1911).

See cases cited supra notes 29 and 43; see also Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S.
66.
128, 133 (1998) (mentioning price-fixing per se rule with approval).
67.

441 U.S. I (1979).

68.

Id. at 9.

69.

Id. at 5.

70. Id. at 18-19. In fact, the Court found that negotiating individual licenses would be downright prohibitive. Id. at 19.
71.

ld. at l l-12.

72.

Id. at 8.

73.

Id. at 7.
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74
Cautioning that "[l]iteralness is overly simplistic and often overbroad,"
the Supreme Court noted that the per se rule against price-fixing should be

applied only in situations where courts have sufficient experience with the

anticompetitive nature of similar business arrangements to reject them as a
75
whole. As such, the Court refused to find BMI's blanket license to be per
7
se illegal. 6 Instead, the Broadcast Music court applied the less restrictive
77
rule of reason to the blanket license. In contrast with the per se rule, which
would have automatically rejected the pricing restraints, the rule of reason

allowed the Court to balance the blanket license's potential harmful effects
7s
on competition with the beneficial ones.

Later opinions, following in Broadcast Music's footsteps, have noted

that the difference between application of the per se rule and the rule of rea

son may turn on whether the pricing restraint in question is considered
7
naked or ancillary to the procompetive goals. 9 A "naked" restraint is one

that has no purpose other than to fix prices, or achieve another anticompeti
so
result.
By contrast, an "ancillary" restraint may generate
s1
procompetitive results. Seen in this light, ancillary restraints are responsi

tive

ble for creating new and different products that could not be achieved by
s
·other means. 2
Section I.A suggests that the GPL's zero-price-fixing term is a restraint

ancillary to a goal of the license: it guarantees that successive generations of

the software are made available on terms that allow for easy exchange. Sec

tion 1.B argues that the free exchange of software creates a new, evolving

product not attainable by more conventional software licenses. Thus, be

cause the GPL's pricing restraint is needed to allow the free exchange of

74. Id. at 9. On the same point, see also Dagher v. Saudi Refining Inc., 369F.3dI108, 1117
(9th Cir. 2004) ("There are some price-fixing arrangements that violate the letter of the Sherman Act
but are legal nonetheless.") (emphasis in original).
75.

Id. at 9.

76.

Id. at 24-25.

77.

Id. (remanding case to lower court for "assessment [of blanket license] under the rule of

reas.:m").
78.

outright).

Id. at 19-21 (discussing justifications for the blanket license rather than condemning it

79. See, e.g., Dagher, 369 F.3d at l l l 8; Nat'! Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984) (referring to price arrangement as "naked restriction");
Nat'! Soc'y of Prof'! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978) (referring to restraint as
"ancillary"); Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756, 763-64 (1999) (discussing
various degrees of nakedness).
80. HOVENKAMP, supra note 36, at 194 ("At one extreme, a 'naked' restraint is one that is
thought to have little potential for social benefit, and thus that can be condemned under a 'per se'
rule . . . . ").
81. Id. ("[A]n 'ancillary' restraint is one that arguably serves a legitimate and socially bene
ficial purpose. ").
82. Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 21-22 (noting that the blanket license was "to some extent, a
different product"); NCAA, 468 U.S. at JOI (refusing to apply per se rule where "horizontal re
straints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all ").
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software, and because the free exchange of software allows the creation of

new products, the restraint should be evaluated under the rule of reason.
A. The GPL's Pricing Restraint Is Needed to Allow

the Free Exchange of Software
This Section argues that the GPL's pricing restraint is ancillary to the
goal of the license. As such, under Broadcast Music the restraint should be
analyzed with an eye toward its potential effects on competition and not
83
84
The "different product" that the GPL creates
5
is not merely the software itself but also freely exchangeable source code,
8
with accompanying efficiencies. 6

under the per se prohibition.

If the GPL's requirement that sublicenses be granted to third parties at

no charge is an ancillary restraint on price, the goals of the license would
87
not be achieved if the pricing restriction were excised from the license. In

order to demonstrate that this is the case, the purpose of the license must be
examined in greater detail. The aim of the GPL is explained in the preamble
88
to the license. It states:
Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you have the
freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for this service if
you wish), that you receive source code or can get it if you want it, that
you can change the software or use pieces of it in new free programs, and
89
that you know you can do these things.

There are two ways to alter the GPL's bundle of rights with respect to

sublicensing so that it would not set a price. First, the GPL could remain

silent as to sublicensing. Alternately, it could require that sublicenses be

granted to third parties without specifying a cost. Neither option would al

low the free exchange of software.

Most obviously, the goal of software that can be freely passed from one

person to another cannot be attained if the license is silent on future distribu-

83.

Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 19-21.

84.

Id. at 22.

85.

The method of software production enabled by the GPL is, however, also unique. See

supra Part J.B.

86. This is particularly true since the GPL is not an exclusive license. Any software licensed
under the GPL can be relicensed under other terms. GPL, supra note 9, at § 10 ("If you wish to
incorporate parts of the Program into other free programs whose distribution conditions are differ
ent, write to the author to ask for permission."). While the GPL only mentions distribution in "free"
programs, it's well-accepted that even for-profit distribution is acceptable. E.g. Reiserfs Credits File
(2004), available within archive at http://ftp.namesys.com/pub/reiserfsprogs/reiserfsprogs-3.6.19.tar.gz,
as reiserfsprogs-3.6.19/CREDITS; see also GPL, supra note 9, at preamble.
87.

See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.

88.

GPL, supra note 9, at preamble.

89.

Id.
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If the GPL did not require that future distribution rights were

passed on, a software maker distributing software under the GPL could sim
9
ply specify that the user could not pass the software on to anyone else. 1
But even if the GPL merely required that the price of sublicense rights
could be determined by the individual distributors, it would fail to achieve
its stated objectives. The problem arises because software released under the
GPL rarely has one--or even ten-authors. In fact, some open source pro
92
jects number thousands of developers. In order to distribute software
without violating copyright, licenses must be obtained from every contribut
93
If each author could demand that the work as a whole

ing software author.

could only be distributed at a particular cost, authors who demanded differ
9
ent payments could not jointly work on a project. 4 And if authors could set
distribution rates on only their portion of the code, scores of transactions
prices for every piece of source code added by a new author-would need to
be conducted in order to make even minor programs available. Furthermore,
authors could set the price for redistribution arbitrarily high, effectively
blocking the purchase of further redistribution rights. Without a uniform
framework for redistribution, larger projects, such as word processors or
9
operating systems, would be essentially impossible. 5
The GPL's pricing restraint, in furtherance of the goal of free software,
96
performs an "aggregating service." As in Broadcast Music, the GPL coor
dinates the work of thousands of programm ers, with at least thousands
97
looking to download the software that they produce; the resulting product
98
contains millions of lines of code. Individual transactions with each of

90. FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, WHAT IS COPYLEFT? (2005), http://www.fsf.org/
licensing/essays/copyleft.html (last visited Sep. 12, 2005) ("If middlemen could strip off the free
dom, we might have many users, but those users would not have freedom.").
91. For an example of a license like this, see Microsoft Windows XP Professional End-User
License Agreement, http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/pro/eula.mspx (last visited Aug. 28,
2005) (giving rights to run on one computer and to transfer product one time but explicitly forbid
ding any other methods of sharing product).
92. BERT J. DEMPSEY, ET AL., A Quantitative Profile of a Community of Open Source Linux
Developers (1999), http://www.ibiblio.org/osrt/develpro.html. Note that this study took place far
before Linux's major growth in the last five years.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). Because the copyright statute gives authors exclusive rights to
distribute their work, id., distribution of a work containing pieces copyrighted by ten authors re
quires a license from each author.
94. This requirement of licensing "as a whole" is derived from the GPL itself. GPL, supra
note 9, at§ 2(b).
95. An additional problem is that allowing individual authors to set prices on later transfer
rights runs into the GFL problem-it would allow competitors swapping code to dictate at least one
another's minimum prices.
96.

Cf Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441U.S. 1, 21 (1979).

97. The number of Linux users is unknown, but it numbers at least in the hundred thousands
and possibly in the millions. For a ballpark estimate, see The Linux Counter, http://counter.li.org
(last visited Aug. 28, 2005).
98. DAVID A. WHEELER, MORE THAN A GIGABUCK: ESTIMATING GNU/LINUX'S SIZE, V. 1.07
(Jul. 29, 2002), http://www.dwheeler.com/sloc/redhat71-v l /redhat7l sloc.html (estimating there are
thirty million lines of source code in Red Hat 7.I). Of course, according to SCO, at least a million of
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these authors would slow the circulation of GPL-based software to a pon
derous crawl. 99 By contrast, the zero-pricing restraint obviates the need to
police downloads for appropriate payment and removes worries about set
ting individual costs.
The GPL's pricing restraint is therefore ancillary to the goal of freely

exchanged software. While it may have some effects on price, it is needed to
achieve a goal other than price-fixing. 100 So long as that goal serves competi

tion, under Broadcast Music, the ancillary restraint should be evaluated

under the rule of reason and not a per se prohibition. 101

B. Freely Exchanged Software Is a New Product

Allowing Software Evolution
Section I.A established that the GPL's pricing restraint was needed to al
low software to be freely exchanged. Yet the free exchange of software is
hardly a necessary condition for software production; in fact, many software
programs currently exist that harshly limit the exchange of software. 102 This
Section argues that the free exchange of software serves competition by al

lowing for faster, more robust evolution of computer code. "Evolution" here
is intended literally: free software shares two important characteristics with
evolving systems.

First, free software favors the survival of the fittest. 10 3 Because source

code is available, users are not limited to passively informing software de

velopers about bugs in the code; they can also track down the bugs' origins
in source code. 104 While many individual users alone may not have the ex

pertise to solve all problems, bugs become easy to fix "when exposed· to a

those suckers must have been stolen. See THE sco GROUP, THE sco GROUP'S OPEN LEITER TO
THE OPEN SOURCE COMMUNITY FROM DARL McBRIDE, (Sept. 9, 2003), http://ir.sco.com/
ReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaselD= 1 1 7587. But see Response to Dari McBride's Open Letter from Eric
Raymond & Bruce Perens to Dari McBride, CEO, of The SCO Group (Sept. 9, 2003),
http://www.catb.org/-esr/writings/mcbride2.html (offering to sell readers of this Note a bridge if
they believe McBride).
99.

See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20.

I 00. The competitive nature of the goal that the license achieves is evaluated in more detail in
Section l.B .
1 0 1 . Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 7 n. 1 0 (noting that a per se rule "ineluctably doom[ing the
license] to extinction" should not apply where the license is not a "naked restraint").
1 02. See supra note 9 1 . To be fair, Microsoft has made some code needed to interact with
Windows available, partially in response to the open source threat. See Shared Source Licensing for
Developers, http://www.microsoft.com/resources/shardsourcenicensing/developer.mspx (last visited
Oct. 30, 2005). But the vast majority of Microsoft's code base is still closed. See Joseph Scott
Miller, Allchin 's Folly: Exploding Some Myths about Open Source Software, 20 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 49 1 , 496 (2002).
1 03. ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN
SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 30-3 1 (200 1 ).
104.

Id. at 3 1
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thousand eager co-developers pounding on every new release."1 05 Or, more
colloquially, "[g]iven enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow."106
Because the life cycle of free software can be extraordinarily rapid, the

software evolves-and improves-at a quicker rate than priced software.

io7

Software disseminated under the GPL does not require elaborate purchase
8
or tracking schemes,10 and software updates need not come on an annual
or even a monthly-basis. 109 The end result is that bugs are swiftly eradi

cated, and users receive the benefits of added features almost immediately.

Second, free software rapidly speciates. Because the source code is read

ily available, a person wishing to write a word processor need not start from

the ground up. Instead, the GPL allows the wholesale appropriation of
source code from other projects.

i io

The end result is a fabulous wealth of

choice. For instance, while many software users recognize that Windows
and Mac OS are two competing graphical user interfaces, users of open

source software can choose between KDE, fvwm, AfterStep, Sawfish, Win

dow Maker, Enlightenment, fluxbox, blackbox, metacity, XFCE, IceWM,
olvwm, mwm, wmz, CDE, the Gnome Desktop, and more than seventy

other potential graphical interfaces that are compatible with Linux.111

"Free software" is a valid goal because it provides evolutionary advan
tages. If everyone has authorization to modify free software, thousands of
users will fix bugs, hundreds of hackers will contribute new features to a

new software product, and scores of coders will create competing programs
105.

Id. at 30

106. Id. Raymond attributes this saying to Torvalds, but he seems to be the first to have voiced
the sentiment in this particular way.
107. For more in this vein, see Ko Kuwahara, Linux: A Bazaar at the Edge of Chaos, FIRST
MONDAY (Feb. 18, 2003), http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue5_3/kuwabara; RICHARD P. GABRIEL &
RON GOLDMAN, Mos SOFTWARE: THE EROTIC LIFE OF CODE, http://www.dreamsongs.com/
MobSoftware.html (last visited Sep. 1 2, 2005).
108.

See supra Part I.A.

109. See RAYMOND, supra note 103, at 29 (noting that the Linux kernel was released more
than once a day in its early stages). Many large-scale projects released under the GPL post "nightly
builds." E.g. Nightly Builds, http://www.mozilla.org/developer/#builds (last visited Sep. 1 2, 2005).
1 10. RAYMOND, supra note 1 03, at 32. While it may sound dreadfully inefficient to have two
people taking two similar projects in slightly different directions, Raymond notes that this "almost
never" happens. Id.
1 1 1 . Window Managers for X, http://xwinman.org (last visited Sep. 1 2, 2005). Don't forget to
check out the not-quite comprehensive list of "others" and "other desktops." Admittedly, some of
the more obscure ones are not useful; there are, however, valid reasons to have several drastically
different desktop environments. For instance, I run fluxbox on my small-screened laptop with puny
processing power, and KDE on my more powerful, more spacious desktop. By contrast, the Michi
gan Law Review computers all run the latest version of Windows on computers that perform
sluggishly to say the least. Not all examples of speciation involve programs that perform similar
functions in the same environment. Unlike Windows, which runs only on PC hardware, or Mac OS,
which runs only on Macintosh hardware, versions of Linux are available that run on PCs, Macs,
DEC Alphas, and SPARC workstations. MILO, LINU X SUMMARY, http://www.osdata.com/oses/
linux.htrn (last visited Sep. 19, 2005). Software released under the GPL adapts with relatively mini
mal difficulty to different environments, including environments as harsh as the iPod. See iPod on
Linux Main Page, http://ipodlinux.org/Main_Page (last visited Sep. 19, 2005) (describing effort to
run Linux on Apple's iPod, a music player that lacks the hardware found in the more typical compu
tational environments listed above).
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that accomplish similar goals by different means. Code that cannot be freely
exchanged cannot easily spawn a new system.112 Software that is released
under the GPL is not just free: it evolves in a way that the non-free alterna
tive does not.

Thus, the goal of free software serves competition by encouraging the

evolution of free software. Without reproduction, there can be no evolution.
And without free exchange, free software can't reproduce.
II. A PRICE OF NOTHING ON S UBSEQUENT DISTRIBUTIONS D EMONSTRATES
THAT THE GOAL Is NOT TO RESTRAIN COMPETITION

Some people have told me they don 't think a fat penguin really embodies
the grace of Linux, which just tells me they have never seen a[n] angry
penguin charging at them in excess of 100 mph. They 'd be a lot more care
ful about what they say if they had. 1 13
The recognition of procompetitive gains does not immediately end scru

tiny of a pricing restraint. 1 14 Instead, a finding of significant benefits begins
inquiry into possible anticompetitive effects of the restraint.115 One major
worry with respect to price-fixing is that competitors who agree to maintain

prices will reap supracompetitive profits. 116 This Part argues that a price of
nothing-in specific circumstances 117-prevents supracompetitive pricing.

Section II.A develops a framework for determining when fixed prices

should be allowed, using Broadcast Music as a guide. Section II.B then ap

plies this framework to the GPL.

A. Broadcast Music: A Framework for Evaluating Nothing
This Section argues that nothing-as a price on subsequent distribu

tions--can alleviate worries of cartel pricing under certain conditions. When

1 1 2. Proprietary code from one project can be used in other projects under two circumstances:
either the owner of the proprietary code must agree to give up the source code or the source code
must be reverse engineered. Both are possible, but the former depends on the whim of the original
author and the latter yields code which is harder to read.
1 1 3. Posting of Linus Torvalds to comp.os.linux.announce, http://groups-beta.google.com/
group/comp.os.linux.announce/msg/fea2a95elea56490 (June 9, 1996 2 1 :29:02 GMT).
1 1 4.

See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.

1 1 5 . See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. In fact, supposedly procompetitive justi
fications that are fronts for harming competition are roundly rejected. E.g., Nat'! Coll. Athletic
Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 1 1 6-- 1 7 ( 1 984) (rejectingjustification that ticket sales
must be preserved because they cannot compete in a free market); Arizona v. Maricopa Med. Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332, 348 ( 1 987) (noting that, despite claims of competitive worries, effect of pricing re
straint might be a "masquerade for an agreement to fix uniform prices"); Nat'! Soc'y of Prof'!
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 ("In sum, the Rule of Reason does not support a defense
based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable."); United States v. Topco Assoc. ,
405 U . S . 596, 6 1 1 - 1 2 (1 972) (noting that the justification that competition itself is ruinous is not
"sufficient to warrant condoning horizontal restraints of trade").
1 1 6.

See United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 ( 1 927).

1 1 7.

See infra Part II.A.
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individual transaction costs are high and distribution costs are, by compari

son, nonexistent, a price of nothing fixed on additional access rights can
save substantial individual effort without risking supracompetitive pricing.

Broadcast Music allowed literal price-fixing in part because the market
for music broadcasting made individualized license transactions prohibi
8
tively expensive.11 Despite great difficulties in supplying single licenses, a

large number of consumers wanted a large number of producers to provide
broadcast rights upon demand.119 In contrast to demand, supplying transac
tions individually would have been onerous. Separate fees per transaction
20
would have been difficult to report and nearly impossible to police.1
These market conditions create initial conditions for one form of legal

ized literal price-fixing: individual transactions are too costly. They also
imply a solution: structure transactions in groups.

Broadcast Music, however, didn't give its blessing to all group

structured transactions. The district court, when overturning the blanket li
2
cense, had suggested that BMI adopt a per-use license instead.1 1 Both per

use and blanket licenses would have been forms of aggregating transactions.

Yet the Court disfavored the per-use license: "per-use licensing . . . might be
22
even more susceptible to the per se rule than blanket licensing."1 Consider

the rationale: the blanket license differed from the per-use license in that it
23
was "sold only a few, rather than a thousand, times."1 The blanket license
24
reduced the need for monitoring and enforcement.1 And most importantly,
the blanket license transformed BMI and ASCAP from a "joint sales

agency" into "a separate seller offering its blanket license, of which the in
25
dividual compositions [were] raw material."1

BMI's blanket license can be recast in explicit price-fixing terms. The
2
cost of the blanket license did not depend on the number of songs played.1 6

Its cost consisted of an initial entrance fee and a uniform charge of nothing
1 27
for each additional song.

1 1 8.

Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1979).

119.

Id.

120.

Id. at 20.

121.

ld. at 7 n. 10.

122.

Id. at 17 n.27.

123.

Id. at 21.

124.

Id.

125.

Id. at 22.

126.

Id. at 5.

127.

Id. This characterization of pricing is also mentioned by William Landes, Indirect Liabil
ity for Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 399 (2003);
William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic Perspec
tive, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. I , 6 n. 1 8 (2000) (describing BMI as a two-part pricing scheme with
initial access charge plus zero marginal cost). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the
Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LE GAL F. 207, 209 (1996) (endorsing flat fee plus no charge for
marginal use scheme for distributing intellectual property).
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While the court dismissed per-song licensing on the grounds that it may
28
actually have been illicit price-fixing,1 fixing the marginal price of broad

cast rights after the first song sent the message that the worry really was
transaction costs: rather than attempting to benefit from every transaction, a
price of nothing allowed the market to redefine what a transaction really was
2
in a way that reduced transaction costs. 1 9 In short, fixing subsequent trans

fers at zero signaled that transaction costs, rather than supracompetitive

pricing, were really what drove the licensing scheme.13° Furthermore, while

it was possible that maximum prices-or even non-zero minimum prices
may have masked a price-fixing scheme, it simply wasn't plausible that zero
.
pnces wou Id do so. 131
The framework for evaluating nothing is thus provided by Broadcast

Music. The market must be one where exchange costs dictate the aggrega
tion of transactions. While fixing prices on each individual transaction could
risk supracompetitive pricing, an access fee followed by a fixed price of

nothing guarantees that the procompetitive goal of reducing transaction

costs is not dominated by anticompetitive worries about prices set by cartel.
B. Applying the Broadcast Music Framework to the GPL

This Section argues that the GPL's pricing restraint fits into the Broad

cast Music framework developed above. As to the market conditions,
2
individual transactions under the GPL are difficult to negotiate,1 3 thousands

of authors and consumers are involved,133 and new software releases occur
swiftly enough that negotiating permissions among these parties is nearly
4
impossible. 13 In contrast, distribution-over the Internet or by CD-grows
continually cheaper.

The distribution condition is likewise fulfilled. The GPL, recall, sets no

price on the initial transfer of software: 135 the company providing the intel

lectual property can charge whatever the market can bear for that transfer.

Instead, the GPL requires distributors to include unlimited access rights at
no charge. 1 36 Thus, as in Broadcast Music, the GPL's license solution fixes

1 28. Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 1 7. See also Arizona v. Maricopa Med. Sec'y, 457 U.S. 332,
348 ( 1 9 82) (noting that fixed maximum prices, despite procompetitive assertions, could be used as a
masquerade to fix uniform prices).
129.

Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 2 1 -22.

1 30. See id. at 2 1 -22 (arguing that transaction costs distinguish the two group licensing
schemes).
1 3 1 . Broadcast Music has been criticized on the grounds that it may mask a price discrimina
tion scheme. See id. at 30-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Whether this worry exists in Broadcast Music
or not, the GPL's price of nothing on future access rights bypasses this concern: price discrimination
is near impossible in markets with easy resale.
1 32.

See supra Part I.A.

1 33.

See supra notes 92-93.

1 34.

See supra notes 1 08-109.

1 35.

GPL supra note 9, at preamble, § I.

1 36.

GPL supra note 9, at § 2(b).
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the transaction cost problem by mirroring the market: it allows for an initial
137
fee followed by essentially unlimited usage.
Likewise, it's simply implausible that the GPL could be used to raise
prices above competitive levels. Because the GPL sets the price of future
138
software at zero,
and because it does not restrict who the software can be
passed on to, most software released under the GPL is available for
139
download at no charge.
What's so great about nothing? Nothing, here, is great because it dem
onstrates that the point of literal price-fixing is to address the rising
transaction costs associated with pooling intellectual property. Instead of
worrying that the goal is a "naked restraint[] of trade with no purpose except
140
charging nothing for subsequent transfers

the stifling of competition,"

guarantees that the pricing restraint will not give rise to supracompetitive
prices.
III. A PRICE OF NOTHING ON FUTURE ACCESS RIGHTS PROTECTS
COMPETITION ON PRODUCT

QUALITY

Really, I'm not out to destroy Microsoft.
That will just be a completely unintentional side effect.

141

While Part II established that the use of the GPL would not result in su
pracompetitively high prices, unnaturally depressed prices, fixed without
142
market competition, may result in consumers receiving inferior products.
This Part addresses the competitive quality of software released under the
GPL. It argues that the use of the GPL improves consumer welfare in the
software market.
In Ariwna

Maricopa County Medical Society, the Court refused to al
143
Even if the price caps instituted
by the medical society would have lowered the price of medical services, "a
v.

low maximum prices for medical services.

1 37.

Cf supra Part II.A

1 38. This is not to imply that all prices of zero are acceptable. In Home Placement Service,
Inc. v. Providence Journal Co. , 682 F.2d 274 ( ! st Cir. 1 982), a newspaper forced a real estate listing
service to charge nothing to potential customers. Id. at 279. Because both the paper and the listing
service targeted renters, the requirement fixed a price of zero. Id. That case can be easily distin
guished from the GPL because neither the market nor the distribution conditions were met: the
market for viewing housing ads is not dominated by transaction costs and the price of nothing was
placed on the initial access fee, not merely on subsequent transfers.
1 39.

See supra note 1 9 and accompanying text.

140. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U. S. 253, 263 ( 1963), quoted in Broad. Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 ( 1 979).
1 4 1 . David Diamond, The Way we Live Now: Questions for Linus Torvalds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
28, 2003, § 6, at 23 (quoting Linus Torvalds).
142. See, e.g. , Arizona v. Maricopa Med. Soc'y, 457 U. S. 332, 348 ( 1 982); Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) ("[S]chemes to fix maximum prices, by substituting the perhaps
erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the competitive market, may severely intrude upon
the ability of buyers to compete and survive in that market.").
143.

Id.
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price restraint that tend[ed] to provide the same economic rewards to all
practitioners regardless of their skill, their experience, their training, or their
144
willingness to employ innovative and difficult procedures"
could gravely
harm consumer welfare. Furthermore, lowered prices might have artificially
"discourage[d] entry into the market and may [have] deter[red] experimen
145
tation and new developments by entrepreneurs."
While the GPL allows the distributor to charge any price for the initial
146
the distribution rights that must be granted at no charge mean that

transfer,

anyone who receives the software can undercut the distributor's initial price.
147

The price of the software will thus tend toward the price of distribution.

BMI's blanket license can be distinguished from the GPL on these grounds;
recall that in Broadcast Music, BMI charged an access fee equal to a per.
.
148
centage of the radio stat10n ' s revenue.
This Part argues that the GPL's lowered prices, and potentially lowered
productivity, will only drive out other software when competition favors
lower-priced alternatives over higher quality. Section III.A contends that if
software released under the GPL drives out higher-quality for-price soft
ware, it does so only when consumers do not value the additional quality
enough to pay the price premium. Section 111.B dispatches the more worri
some argument that network effects in computer software may create long
term inefficiencies. Because the GPL mandates open access to the source
code, competitors can easily break in to any network dependent on GPL
based software.
A. Free Software Displaces Priced Software

Only under Competitive Circumstances
This Section argues that free software will displace superior-quality
priced software only when consumers prefer the lower-priced alternative.
The GPL and similar copyright licenses may reduce incentives for software
149
developers to create.
Furthermore, the availability of free software could
150
lead consumers to abandon paying versions of the software. The end result
is that for-price manufacturers producing superior products might be forced

144.

Id. at 348.

145.

Id.

146.

GPL, supra note 9, at preamble, § I.

147.

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

148.

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.

149. See David S. Evans & Bernard J. Reddy, Government Preferences for Promoting Open
Source Software: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 3 1 3, 388
(2003).
1 50. See, e.g., Posting of P. Douglas to http://news.zdnet.com/5208-9595-0.html?forumlD= l &
threadlD=2014&messagelD=42424&start=l 3 (Mar. 2 , 2004); Wallace Comp!., supra note 50; Let
ter from Dari McBride, CEO, The SCO Group, to Unnamed Congress Person (Jan. 8, 2004),
available at http://www.osaia.org/letters/sco_hill.pdf.
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out of business. The potential for quality problems with software released
151

under the GPL is significant.

Even if these assertions are true, this argument is insufficient to con
demn software released under the GPL under antitrust laws. Antitrust law
152
It does not command that an in
protects "competition, not competitors."
dustry produce the best possible product with no respect to price; instead, it
seeks to assure that an industry produces the optimum product that consum
ers are willing to purchase. Assuming a competitive market, a no-cost
alternative will only drive out a higher-quality higher-priced product be
cause consumers have decided that the additional quality is not worth the
53
pnce. 1
•

154

Antitrust law will not protect higher-quality products from competition.

In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Oklahoma Board of Regents
155
of the University of Oklahoma,
the NCAA attempted to justify reducing
output of televised games by arguing that increasing television coverage
56
While personal attendance at football
would erode game attendance. 1
games is widely considered superior to watching broadcasted coverage,
television shows are substantially cheaper. The Supreme Court, however,
157
refused to protect the obviously superior product of game attendance.
"[A]t bottom the NCAA's position is that ticket sales for most college games
158

are unable to compete in a free market."

Likewise, if people generally prefer free software to paying for higher
quality software, it doesn't matter that some software manufacturers may be
inconvenienced. At bottom, software makers who object are really objecting
159

to the fact that they are unable to compete in the market.

1 5 1 . The existence of these problems are, however, hotly disputed. See supra, Part l.B. ; see
also RAYMOND, supra note 103, at 67-1 1 1 (arguing that open source acts as a gift and reputation
economy, providing incentives to create); ToRVALDS, supra note 2, at 245-49 (arguing that most
human activity is motivated by fun, not money); Yochai Benkler, Coase 's Penguin, or, Linux and the
Nature of the Firm, 1 12 YALE L.J. 369, 426--34 (2002) (noting that people perform some activities
less
when
they
are
paid
for
them).
See
also
iPod
on
Linux
FAQ,
http://ipodlinux.org/FAQ#What_is_this.3F (last visited Sep. 1 9, 2005) (answering the question
"[w]hy would you want to do that?" not with "because we hope to make a stunning profit" but with
"[flor a number of reasons, but mainly because we can."); Bad_CRC, All Your Base Video,
http://www.planettribes.com/allyourbase/AYB2.swf (2001) (photoshopping the phrases "all your
base are belong to us," "you have no chance to survive make your time," and "somebody set us up
the bomb" into a large number of pictures accompanied by music for no financial reason).
1 52.

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 ( 1962) (emphasis removed).

1 53. Some consumers may prefer paying for the high-quality version, but there's no reason
antitrust law should insist that everyone else subsidize their preferences by banning the no-cost
version.
1 54. Nat'! Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 1 16-1 7 ( 1 984).
1 55.

Id.

1 56.

Id. at 1 15-16.

1 57.

Id.

1 58.

Id. at 1 1 6.

1 59.

Cf id.
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B. Access to Source Code Reduces Anticompetitive Network Effects
When it comes to antitrust, computer software may raise special con
cerns: because of network externalities, perfect competition may be illusory.
This s�ction argues that software released under the GPL minimizes the
market distortions associated with software networks.
Anticompetitive effects may arise in the c omputer software field because
the software that one user adopts can affect what software another user
160
adopts.
For instance, if one person uses a particular word processor that
relies on a proprietary file format, others are more likely to do so. The ease
of sharing the same file format, or of being able to instruct others in ways to
use particular features, adds more value to the software than just the sum of
161
Software thus has a tendency to attract more users when its

its features.

preexisting user base is large. This tendency is known as a network effect,
because the interaction of users creates a network that reinforces the use of
162
one particular piece of software.
In the software industry, network effects
163
tend to reduce competition by raising barriers to entry.
Network effects may have troubling implications for long-term competi
164
A software product may become dominant at some initial time, by

tion.

clever marketing or actual superiority. Once it has achieved that dominance,
its common usage will make it difficult for people to switch at a later time to
new and superior software. Concerns about interoperability may convince
others to stay with the original software, rather than switching to a competi
tor.
The antitrust worries associated with network effects are not unique to
the GPL, but because financial remuneration is limited, they may have addi
165
tional force.
Because there are financial limitations on recouping
investments in intellectual property that is released under the GPL, software
released under the GPL may not add features as quickly as they would be
added to a program where users regularly pay for a new version. The soft
166
This

ware in question could thus fail to maintain its superiority over time.

1 60. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Ef
fects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 483, 491 ( 1 998).
1 6l .

Id. at 488.

1 62. See id. ; see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcoNOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 396-97 (2003).
1 63.

See id.

1 64.

See id. at 396-97, 399-400.

1 65. See id. ; see also Lemley & McGowan, supra note 1 60, at 500-21 (detailing several anti
trust lawsuits that are based on worries surrounding network effects).
1 66. For those familiar with Linux desktop usage figures, widespread adoption sufficient to
dominate a network sounds like a pipedream. It is difficult to obtain estimates of Linux usage, as
users need not register or purchase software licenses. Reasonable estimates, however, range around
one percent. Grant Gross, ls the Age of Desktop Linux Approaching?, PC WORLD, Oct. 23, 2003,
available at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid, 1 1 3069,00.asp. Markets other than the desk
top market may, however, play a role. Mozilla Firefox, a browser released under the GPL (as well as
under other licenses), has grabbed twelve percent of the desktop market shortly after its initial re
lease. Nouvelle etude Firefox sur 29 pays d'Europe: La France poursuit sa progression et la
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becomes a problem because network effects may prevent the adoption of
software that provided those features. Even if all consumers would prefer to
pay for the new software, worries about interoperability might prevent a
sizable number of people from switching to the new software.
The question of software inferiority is empirical and-as software re
leased under the GPL lacks sufficient market share at this point-entirely
hypothetical. But network effects in software are only particularly trouble
some because the software market has high barriers to entry: competitors
must not only write a software program from scratch, but must guess as to
167

how to make it work with the dominant product.

While software released under the GPL might reduce a developer's abil
ity to recoup creative investments, in comparison with the typical copyright
license, the GPL drastically reduces the barriers to entry. Most obviously,
under the GPL, a competitor could easily make innovative changes to the
available source code, and release a new improved work that nonetheless
168
used the standards of the dominant software. This new software could eas
ily interact with the network because it would be, essentially, only a
169
This modi
110
fied version, of course, would have to be released under the GPL.

modified version of the original network-dominating software.

But even those who don't choose to release their software under the
GPL will benefit from its open-access principles. Consider what happens to
those who prefer another software license.
First, the widespread availability of software released under the GPL
would not preclude the use of other licenses. Potential competitors are not
restricted to making improvements to GPL source code; they can always
develop their own program. In the absence of dominant GPL software, this
endeavor would entail a great deal of time and effort.
But the GPL's provision of source code for the price of nothing reduces
barriers to entry. The typical software copyright license, uninterested in fa
cilitating the sharing of intellectual property, does not provide source code.
This means that competitors usually lack the blueprints that explain how to
111
interact with the dominant software network. The result is that competitors
to proprietary software need to build competing software from the ground
up. Even then, their activities are restricted by worries that file formats may
not be precisely identical, leading to botched transfers and incomplete inter
operability. In contrast, under the GPL, the source code of the software is

Finlande passe Jes 30%, http://www.xitimonitor.com/etudes/equipementl O.asp (July 1 7, 2005). And
depending on how market share is defined, software released under the GPL may have near
monopolies on computing clusters or other scientific uses.
1 67. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1 62, at 396 ("But the antitrust concern with network
externalities is not centrally about technological inferiority but about barriers to entry.").
1 68.

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 1 03-05 ( 1999).

169.

Id. at 105.

1 70.

GPL, supra note 9, at §§ 1 , 2.

171.

LESSIG, supra note 1 68, at 1 07.
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available. Competitors can download and view that software without bind
172
ing themselves to distribution of their software on its terms.
173
Source code makes software standards transparent.
Instead of having
to reverse engineer file format protocols, potential competitors can directly
examine the code and determine exactly how to interoperate with the net
174
This drastically reduces the barriers to entry for
175
a competitor who wishes to write the code from the ground up. A competi
work-dominant software.

tor who does not wish to release code under the GPL may nevertheless have
a significant advantage competing with code released under the GPL, as
compared to the more typical copyright license.
The availability of source code reduces barriers to entry by addressing
compatibility issues. When the source code is not provided, network effects
can be a very real problem: it is difficult to ensure compatibility if the oper
ating requirements of one program cannot be discerned. But programmers
that provide source code spell out the standards for interacting with their
176
Nothing--0r supplying source code at no charge-is great be

software.

cause it ensures easier compatibility.
Copyright law would not require developers who viewed source code to
license it under the GPL. While it would be copyright infringement to copy
the code directly, copyright protects the expression of ideas, not the idea
177
Searches through bug archives might help developers of non-GPL

itself.

software to find ways to solve similar tricky problems, without either di
178
A

rectly copying code or reproducing a substantially similar version.

competitor could therefore learn from the mistakes of GPL developers while
creating a competing version that would not have to be released under the
GPL.
Thus, with respect to the GPL, competing developers can create com
petitive works at a substantially lower cost than if the GPL-based software
had been released under a typical copyright license. If the competition
wished to use the code in a later piece of software, the GPL's price of noth
ing on access rights allows that. If the competition wanted to see how to
program a competing piece of software that interacts with other GPL-based

1 72. See GPL, supra note 9 (only requiring release of software under the GPL for works
copying source code released under the GPL).
1 73.

LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 57-58 (2001 ).

1 74.

Id. at 60-61 .

1 75. See Id. at 49; Nicholas D. Wells, Note, Government Use of Free Software, 33 PuB. CON.
L.J. 565, 575 (2004) (noting lowered barriers to entry); Evan s & Reddy, supra note 149, at 388. Cf
Joseph P. Kendrick, Comment, Does Sound Travel in Cyberspace?, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus.
L. 39, 40-4 1 (2004) (arguing that open music licenses reduce barriers to entry).
1 76.

LESSIG, supra note 1 73, at 57-6 1 .

1 77. See Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 ( 1 880) (stating generally applicable version of rule);
Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1 222, 1 236 ( 1986) (applying
idea/expression dichotomy in computer software context).
1 78. Several open source bug archives are freely searchable online. E.g., Linux Kernel
Tracker, http://bugzilla.kemel.org/ (last visited Nov. I , 2005) (allowing general public to search for
software bugs, both past and present, and providing sections of code that solve those problems).
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projects, the GPL allows that as well. And what if a competitor just wanted
to learn about programming techniques? Nothing--or the free availability of
access rights-lets her do that as well.
So nothing, surprisingly fertile, turns out to be great for yet another rea
son: it requires producers of GPL-based software to make available tools to
prevent GPL-based software from excluding proprietary software.
CONCLUSION

Price-fixing has long been considered per se illegal. This per se prohibi
tion on price-fixing is justified because price-fixing can lead to both higher
prices for consumers and lowered quality. The Supreme Court has recog
nized,

however,

that

literal

price-fixing

that

nonetheless

achieves

procompetitive goals should not be condemned.
Had the GPL required that distributors give licenses to third parties only
by charging a specified amount, it would have engaged in price-fixing. But
specifying a price of zero is only price-fixing in the literal sense: there' s
something great about nothing.
Specifically, "nothing" guarantees that the dangers associated with
price-fixing can be averted. It is impossible to charge a supracompetitive
price when the parties involved can redistribute the software for free. Like
wise it is impossible to dominate the market with inferior software if your
open access requirements allow competitors to mimic your source code,
your algorithms, or your data access routines. Nothing-as a price both on
transferring software and on accessing the source code-allows competitive
worries about pricing to disappear.
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